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ABSTRACT
The use of CNG in bus and private vehicles is growing
steadily. Recent fire accidents involving CNG buses
have shown that tanks may explode though compliant
with current ECE UN R110 regulation. Such a repeated
scenario is certainly not acceptable having in mind the
tremendous amount of energy released when a
compressed tank bursts. Investigation of German and
French recent cases detailed in this article highlights
potential improvements in current CNG buses fire safety
concepts. Among others, it includes to rely on a system-
level test and expectations in combination with the
current component-level test. Fire safety should not
solely rely on tank behaviour when exposed to fire but
also to additional and upstream fire safety barriers.
Thermal fuses can not be seen any more as an ultimate
option to control tank burst in case of fire.
INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, the use of CNG (Compressed
Natural Gas) in vehicles has been increasing all over
Europe as a "green" alternative to conventional liquid
fuels. According to the European Natural Gas Vehicle
Association (ENGVA), the European CNG fleet is
estimated to about 550 000 vehicles of all types (city
buses, private cars...) with a prominent share for Italy
(see picture below).
Total : 550.000
Figure 1: CNG vehicles number and distribution in
Europe in 2005 (from European Natural Gas Véhicule
Association)
France counts about 1600 city buses. The number of
CNG vehicle will be on the rise in France, especially for
private vehicles due to the introduction of CNG vehicles
home refuelling apparatus.
Natural gas is stored onboard vehicles under 200 bar in
metallic or composite tanks. For buses, tanks are
associated in series (tank system) and located on the
roof.
In comparison with liquid-fuel-powered buses, CNG
buses may pause additional hazards which comprise:
• tank burst and associated pressure waves,
projectiles (projection of tank fragments and other
equipment) and eventually thermal effects (fire ball
resulting from the combustion of released natural
gas),
jet fire and associated thermal and pressure effects,
• and finally explosive atmosphere and associated
thermal and pressure effects.
Mechanical1 (road accident...) and thermal aggressions
(onboard or nearby fire) are the main causes that may
lead to any of the above hazards. Though tank burst is
not supposed to happen based on existing UN ECE
regulations [3], recent CNG buses tank bursts in Europe
have highlighted potential deficiencies in the present fire
safety concept.
Therefore, we will concentrate in this article on CNG bus
fire safety issues. After introducing the CNG bus fire
safety topic, we will study recent CNG bus fires in
France and Germany and will extract "lessons to be
learned" for CNG and other compressed fuels such as
hydrogen.
CNG BUS FIRE SAFETY STRATEGY
Fire onboard buses may be caused by internal or
external factors. Internal factors include events such as
electrical short circuits, excessive temperature of bus
components including the braking system, the turbo-
compressor, the exhaust pipe... in combination with
combustible materials including polymeric materials, oil,
dust and debris... . Experience shows that fires usually
start in the engine compartment [9].
As far as external causes are concerned we can
mention human error during maintenance (use of open
flames...), vandalism and propagating fires from nearby
vehicles or infrastructure.
The most unwanted event in case of CNG bus fire is the
burst of one or more of the compressed storage tanks
located on the roof of the vehicle. Tank burst is definitely
not a tolerable option having in mind the tremendous
amount of mechanical and chemical energy released in
the course of this event.
The current safety strategy to prevent tank burst
consists in fitting pressurised tanks with devices that
release stored compressed natural gas as they fuse
under the effect of temperature rise (fire). The melting
temperature of these fuses is about 110°C. In practical
terms, to prevent tank burst, internal tank pressure has
to decay before the fire degrades the mechanical
strength of the compressed storage. Experience shows
that unprotected tank (inhibited pressure relief devices)
can not survive a standard bonfire test for more than few
minutes [4] & [5]. The main cause for a tank to burst is
the decay of its mechanical strength and rise in internal
pressure.
Therefore, pressure relief devices (PRD) should be
capable of depressurising a tank within a couple of
minutes. According to experience, bus tanks can be
exposed to fire for about 20 to 30 minutes which is an
average time frame for a bus to be burnt out2.
Isolated compressed tank or tank systems are submitted
to standardised bonfire test (component-level test
according to UN ECE R110, test A15 [3]) to certify that
they work in accordance with this fire safety strategy.
Though tank burst is not supposed to happen, recent
CNG buses tank bursts in Europe have highlighted
potential deficiencies in the existing fire safety concept.
PRESSURISED TANK BURST
Large quantity of mechanical and chemical energy are
stored in compressed combustible gas storage. Sudden
release of this energy in case of tank burst may cause
some severe damage to the bus environment.
When a tank bursts, observation shows [4] two
consecutive pressure wave propagating in the
surrounding environment. The first one which is also the
more severe is associated with the pneumatic rupture
(gas expansion) whereas the second is caused by the
combustion of the released combustible gas into the air
(fire ball). It is therefore to be noticed that although the
chemical energy stored is usually an order of magnitude
larger than the mechanical energy, the sudden release
of the mechanical energy induces greater overpressure
effects.
Theoretically, the pneumatic burst of a 130 L tank at a
pressure of 200 bar releases an energy equivalent to the
detonation of about 1.85 kg of TNT (8.7 MJ). Windows
can be broken within a 30 meters radius (50 mbar) and
pressure wave induced lethality is to be foreseen within
a radius of 12 meters (140 mbar). These calculations
can worsen due to pressure wave reflection and
pressure build up as well as to directional energy
release (axial direction) due to the rupture mode of the
cylindrical tank. Moreover, projectiles can also cause
severe damages within a radius much larger than the
one estimated above for overpressure effects. [5] shows
that fragments of up to 14 kg (type IV tank filled with
hydrogen at 350 bar, test conducted in open atmosphere
/ projectiles not hindered by bus equipment) have
travelled a distance of 82 m from tank fire location. The
mechanical energy released as the tank ruptured was
equivalent to about 1.35 kg of TNT (6.3 MJ).
Therefore, an unacceptable event such as a tank burst
induces a significant damage radius (missiles and
overpressure) that goes far beyond the bus geometry.
This makes a major difference with conventional liquid-
fuel-buses with damage radius in case of fire limited to
the bus itself (unless the fire propagates).
1
 There is no evidence so far of any mechanically
induced rupture failures of tanks in CNG service world-
wide. This scenario is however plausible.
It takes about 10 to 15 minutes for a bus to be fully
involved in fire.
The tank may be subject to fire aggression in various
ways:
• engulfing fire as combustible materials in the vicinity
of the tank are burning,
• localised fire aggression (at one end of the tank) as
combustible materials in the vicinity of the tank are
burning,
• and finally impinging jet flame fed with high pressure
natural gas.
Experience shows that fire protected tanks may not
survive some of the aggressions above indicating that
PRD efficiency is limited. This limitation should be
acknowledged.
Indeed [4] has shown that protected tanks can not
survive an impinging jet flame and will fail within a
couple of minutes. As far as localised thermal
aggressions are concerned we could expect thermal
fuses not to be triggered and the tank to fail depending
on the distance between local flames and the PRD.
Finally, the less severe case for protected tank integrity
which consists in engulfing flame is basically what PRD
are useful for. This test is part of the certifying process of
protected tanks as mentioned before.
RECENT TANK BURST ON OPERATED CNG
BUSES
We can mention three CNG bus fire accidents in Europe
where one of the tank did burst. The table below
summarises the three cases.
CNG articulated buses. Each articulated bus was fitted
with 10 CNG type III PRD protected tanks of 172 L each














































Figure 2: Side picture of a bus similar the ones that
burned (from [6])
On-site first responders tried to put out the fire without
success and then called the local fire brigade that
arrived on the scene at 3:09 pm.
The fire propagated from the back of the first bus to
another articulated bus parked in a row at 1.5 meters
behind. At 3:09 pm the fire is well developed inside the
depot and violent explosions occur. These explosions
are caused by the release through actuated PRDs,
mixing and later combustion of natural gas inside the
depot. Both buses have been burnt out whereas the
other ones have been extracted from the depot before
they caught fire. The first bus burnt from the back to the
front. The second bus burnt the opposite way.
Table 1: Summary of the three studied bus fire accidents
Figure 3: View of the fire once it was under control
(from [6])
19 of the 20 CNG tanks exposed to the fire did behave
as expected. The stored gas was released through
PRDs hence preventing tanks from exploding. Each tank
was fit with two boss mounted PRDs (one on each
boss). All 38 PRDs did open at about 110°C as expected
for the 19 tanks.
THE SAARBRUCKEN ACCIDENT: DESCRIPTION AND
LEARNING
Description [21 & [61
The fire started on a CNG articulated bus in the engine
compartment (back of the bus). When the fire took off at
3:00 pm, the bus was parked in a depot along with other
It went a different way for one of the tanks mounted on
the second bus whereas the fire was "under control".
The tank burst about 15 minutes after the fire started. A
large tank fragment was propelled in the tank axial
direction. It broke through a nearby wall (hole at 3
meters from ground level) flew through the air and
damaged another wall located 25 meters further and
ended up its journey on the roof of a bus parked in a
nearby depot. The tank that burst was the first in the row
when looking at the bus from the front (tank n°1). The
fire was put out at 4:30 pm. Nobody was injured.
Figure 4: Destroyed bus with red arrows pointing (from
right to left), tank n°3, hanging tank n°2 and hole through
which tank n°1 flew (from [6])
z '
Figure 5: Remains of tank n°1 after it landed (from [6])
One should notice that tanks were isolated one from the
other. The emptying of one tank through its PRDs did
not cause adjacent tanks' pressure to decay.
Investigation lead to the following explanations. Tank
n°1 burst for two concomitant reasons:
• on one hand it suffered a local fire stress when a
fire-induced short-circuit triggered the opening of a
roof door mounted nearby tank n°1 (Picture 6).
Flame broke through this opening and heated up
tank n°1 in its middle part,
• on the other hand, PRDs mounted on tank n°1 did
fail to open, hence preventing the tank from
depressurising. Investigation concluded that failure
to open was caused by an insufficient heat up of the
PRDs that did not melt completely. The protective
cover mounted on the top of tanks contributed to
prevent sufficient heat to reach the PRDs.
Figure 6: Roof opening ahead of tank n°1 (from [6])
Figure 7: Example of one closed PRD from tank n°1.
Picture shows that the metal fuse did not have time to
melt completely (from [6])
Learnings
This accident confirmed that boss mounted PRD on both
side of a bus tank is not an ultimate protection if
pressurised tanks are exposed to localised fire (sunroof
or any other opening underneath or nearby the tanks):
PRD may fail to work in time.
In that case PRDs did not fail because they froze3 but
because flames heat did not reach them fast enough.
Therefore, a tank system that survives a bonfire test
may not survive in a real life situation, similarly a fuse
that works correctly in test condition may operate
differently in real life conditions. Indeed, as the bonfire
test only focuses on the tank system and does not
consider the entire vehicle, it misses synergetic effects
induced by the association of tank system and the
vehicle. This remark underlines that tank fire protection
and bus fire safety can not rely only on the performance
of isolated protected tank systems.
Further developments of the current "bonfire test" are
necessary in order to consider the entire vehicle as
suggested also by [7] & [8]. Besides, any opening
underneath or nearby the tank must be avoided (or be
sealed and fire resistant). Finally, PRD performance and
potential failures should be further investigated including
PRD freezing has also been observed in the past. It is
known to be the consequence of a competing effect
between the heat from the fire and the cooling down
from expanding gas.
appropriate location that does not shield them from heat
or allow them to freeze. As far as freezing is concerned,
new PRDs exist with fuse made of glass-cylinders
containing expanding liquids. Glass brakes up at 110°C
and completely free the release orifice with no possibility
of PRD reclosure.
THE MONTBÉLIARD ACCIDENT: DESCRIPTION AND
LEARNING
Description
A 12 meter CNG bus was in daily commercial service on
the 1st of August 2005. This bus was equipped with nine
126 L, 200 bar working pressure type IV CNG tanks.
Each of the nine tanks was fitted with one thermal fuse
located alternatively on the right or on the left side of the
bus. There were two other thermal fuses located
respectively ahead and behind the tank system. These
two fuses are supposed to open before the fire reaches
the tank system (from the front or the rear of the bus).
One single valve isolates the entire tank system from
downstream components which means that when the
valve is closed the tanks remained connected one to the
others. The only way to isolate one tank from the others
is to shut down its manual valve. Gas release deviators
pointing upwards are mounted on the PRDs outlet in
order to discharge CNG in the upward direction.
Bended pipes










Figure 8: Top view of a CNG bus of a similar type to the
one that caught fire (tank cover has been removed for
taking the picture)
CNG tanks were full as the bus was just starting its
working day. At 06:15 am, the driver saw an alarm signal
on the dashboard indicating "no battery charging". He
then called his central office that suggested to turn off
the engine in order to reset the electronics. He tried but
did not succeed to switch off the engine and finally drove
away as suggested by the central office. Few kilometres
later, as the bus was leaving the city center, the driver
witnessed an abnormal heavy smoke rising from left side
of the motor room and smelled something burning. He
stopped the bus at the village exit and evacuated the 3
passengers. He then tried to put off the fire with the
onboard extinguisher by injecting the chemical agent
through the motor room ventilation grids (as prescribed).
He did not succeed to put off the fire. As the fire rapidly
propagated, he called the fire brigade at 6:27 am. Then,
the driver saw the PRDs opening progressively from the
rear to the front of the bus as the fire was propagating.
By the time the fire brigade arrived at 6:40 am, the fire
had propagated to the entire bus. Firemen rapidly set a
safety perimeter. As they arrived on the scene, they
witnessed jet flames pointing upwards (about 5 meters
high and more) and a shorter one pointing horizontally.
These jet flames were fed by PRDs releases.
Firemen stood at a safe distance in front of the bus and
tried to cool down the tank system with water spray. 10
minutes later at 6:51 am, the front cylinder exploded
causing slight and directional damages to the
environment within a distance of 100 m. Damages were
caused by tank debris (tank n°1 damaged the roof of an
adjacent house after a 30 m fly) and overpressure
(poster frame unhooked and damaged sliding shutters
60 m away from explosion). As it burst, tank n°1 also
propelled the adjacent tank to the other side of the road
(10 m away). The tank n°1 ruptured in large pieces
whereas carbon fiber could be found as far as 150 m
away. Tank n°1 valve and associated fuse have not
been found after the accident. Bursting noise could be
heard at a 5 km distance. Firemen did not report any
noticeable fireball though they felt a transient heat.
Nobody was injured.
Figure 9: Side view of the bus with tank n°3 hanging
(Courtesy SDIS 25)
Figure 10: Top view of the bus (Courtesy SDIS 25)
Figure 11: Tank n°1 after burst (Courtesy SDIS 25)
Figure 12: Tank n°2 propelled on the other side of the
road (Courtesy SDIS 25)
Investigation took place and some realistic explanations
can be put forward:
1. Excessive depressurisation time or no
depressurisation at all for tank n°1 :
PRDs which were mounted on the bus were not
of a fast release type since they were fitted with
a 1.5 mm flow limiter orifice in order to comply
with an ancient French draft regulation dated
from 1996 (before ECE R110 took over) that
required emptying time to be comprised
between 25 to 35 minutes. This surprising
timeframe which is not compatible with bus fire
kinetics was deemed to mitigate gas releases
through PRDs in confined spaces like tunnels or
parking structures,
Since tanks are not isolated one from the others
the pressure drops evenly in the entire tank
system. However, if one tank is manually
isolated from the others, its internal pressure will
not drop unless its sole thermal fuse is actuated
(single thermal fuse located upstream from
manual valve for odd tanks like tank n°1 and
located on the bottom boss of the tank for even
tanks). The tank n°1 manual valve may have
been voluntarily shut off in order to use its gas
content as a back up.
2. Localised thermal aggression that caused tank
mechanical strength to weaken and tank to burst:
The fire broke through the roof opening located
20 cm ahead of tank n°1 and caused a severe
localised thermal stress in the middle part of
tankn°1,
A horizontal jet flame may have come from tank
n°2 PRD release and also caused a severe
localised thermal stress to the bottom of tank
n°1. This abnormal horizontal jet flame is a
possibility since on one hand firemen witnessed
horizontal jet flames and on the other hand PRD
outlet deviators (on even tanks) have been
found pointing horizontally when investigating
bus remains. Deviators may have collapsed
during the fire or some times before due to
vibrations or other operational constraints.
As for the fire cause, experts concluded that it was an
electrical failure of the alternator system located on the
left side of the engine room.
Out of the 11 PRDs mounted directly on tanks, 3 have
been lost during the accident: the one mounted ahead of
tank n°1, the one mounted on tank n°1 (plus its manual
valve) as well as the thermal fuse of tank n°2. It is
therefore not possible to conclude on any failure of these
thermal fuses4 such as:
• Insufficient heat up of PRDs to melt the fuse (like in
Saarbriicken),
• Freezing of PRDs,
• misuse of manual valve n°1,
• or any failure of the deviator mounted on tank n°2.
Learnings
Some learnings are common with the German case and
some others are specific. First of all, it is advisable to
avoid roof openings unless they can offer a fire
resistance at least equivalent to that of the roof as well
as any design that may cause tanks to suffer from
localised thermal stress in a fire scenario.
Then, it is advisable that tank complete emptying take
place within few minutes after the PRD opened. In that
case, detailed study should be undertaken for accidental
release of natural gas inside confined spaces like tunnel
or parking structures as explosion may occur.
Thermal fuses were of the same type as those involved
in the Saarbrucken accident.
The PRD outlet must be so designed that the fire jet can
only point upward and can not in any circumstances
impinge a nearby tank.
Finally, both accidents have shown that first responders
did not manage to put out the fire. This may suggest that
early response fire fighting means or procedures are not
appropriate for an efficient action. However, heavy fire
fighting capacities will never be available within the first
couple of minutes. Automatic or manually actuated fire
suppression systems located in the engine compartment
should therefore be envisaged in order to effectively
control fire development. Automated or manually
actuated fire suppression systems in the engine room
where fires are most likely to start are of a primary
relevance for CNG buses. These systems may be highly
relevant having in mind that somehow vulnerable
compressed gas cylinders are mounted on the bus roof
in a design that severely expose tank cylinders to the
fire.
THE BORDEAUX ACCIDENT: SHORT DESCRIPTION
AND LEARNING
The bus concerned by this later accident is exactly of the
same type as the one we have just presented in the
Montbeliard case though accidental circumstances are
different. On the 8th of November 2005, at 6:50 pm,
vandals deliberately threw a Molotov cocktail inside the
passenger compartment at the rear of the bus. At that
time the remaining pressure inside the storage system
was estimated between 100 and 70 bar. Witnesses
reported that the fire propagated rapidly and soon broke
through the roof panel mounted 20 cm ahead of tank
n°1. Tank n°1 burst within 10 minutes after fire broke out
and before the fire brigade arrived. Horizontal jet flames
were also witnessed meaning that PRD release
deviators did also collapsed. Finally, firemen reported
various moderate deflagrations. Damages were limited
and nobody was injured as a result of this accident.
-
Figure 13: View of the bus after the fire (courtesy bus
manufacturer)
Figure 14: View of tank n°1 that exploded (one half)
Figure 15: View of the bus from the inside (tank n°2)
Figure 16: View of the bus from the inside (tank n°2)
Learnings from the Montbéliard and Saarbrucken cases
also fully apply to this one. However, we can also, in that
specific case, underline the vulnerability of buses when
submitted to vandalism as fire propagates very rapidly:
tank n°1 exploded before the fire brigade arrived. A fire
suppression system located in the engine room as
suggested above would have been of no use in this
specific case. Therefore, additional fire safety measures
should be thought of as discussed in the next paragraph.
PROPOSED REVISIONS OF FIRE SAFETY
STRATEGY FOR CNG BUSES
Up to now, fire safety and associated tank burst control
measures as suggested in ECE R110 concentrate on
tank system protection using PRDs. This strategy
necessitates PRDs to be both highly reliable and to be
efficient in various types of compressed tank fire
stresses whether homogeneous or localised. Though
none of the bus presented above were ECE R110
compliant (they were put in service before ECE R110
was promulgated), experience discussed in that article
has proven the safety strategy that consists in focussing
on tank systems not to be always appropriate. Fire
safety for CNG buses should rely on more sensible
principles as those applied on a usual basis whenever
managing risk i.e. prevent, limit and mitigate
consequences.
Therefore, the following measures should be technically
investigated:
• fire prevention by limiting and controlling engine
temperature, by limiting combustible materials in the
engine compartment and by cleaning up any
accumulated oil or other combustible debris,
• fire detection including periodic maintenance of
installed detection systems,
• fire suppression either automatic (fire detectors) or
manually actuated,
• fire propagation control by segregating the engine
compartment from the passenger compartment and
of course the CNG storage with at least 1/4 hour fire
resistant material. This 1/4 hour rating should give
sufficient time for the fire brigade to arrive to set up a
safety perimeter and to deploy significant fire fighting
capacities before the fire has propagated to the gas
storage.
As far as CNG tanks are concerned additional measures
to those mentioned above should apply. These
measures could mainly consist in further limiting tank
exposure to fire by coating tanks with thermal shield
materials or by designing a 1/4 hour fire resistant roof.
PRDs should be extensively tested. It is advisable to
locate them on both ends of each tank with no means for
released gas to impinge on a nearby tank. Regarding
PRD response time, discussion should take place on the
appropriateness for early PRD opening in a fire scenario
having in mind natural gas explosions it may cause in
confined environment. Systematic and early release
might be a delicate choice. We would, if confined
releases are an issue, favour the strategy that considers
PRD opening (fast flow) as an ultimate safety option if
the others have not been sufficient to prevent severe
tank exposure.
In parallel, we would expect a fire protected tank with
inhibited PRD to be able to withstand fire exposure for at
least 15 minutes in order to give sufficient time for
firemen to arrive on the accident scene and to set up a
safety perimeter.
This type of test should also be standardised as a
complementary test to the bonfire test with PRD
protected tanks that rather investigates the effectiveness
of the PRD to prevent tanks from bursting rather than
the tank itself. Limitation of the current bonfire test are
well described in [7] & [8].
On a more general basis, component-level tests as
prescribed by ECE R110 though useful are not sufficient
as they may miss synergetic effects between the bus
and the tank system. A system-level fire strategy is
highly advisable to prevent any more tank from bursting.
Therefore, in combination with proposed measures, a
complementary system-level bonfire test is also highly
advisable in order to evaluate the safe behaviour of a
CNG bus when submitted to a engine room or
passenger compartment fire.
TODAY CNG BUSES AND TOMORROW... CH2
BUSES
Lessons learned from CNG buses are entirely applicable
to future compressed (CH2) hydrogen buses since
storage technology is similar though storage pressure is
significantly higher (350 bar for CH2 buses). As
innovative technologies, we would hope that inherently
safe fire safety principles will be incorporated into their
design.
EC has recently submitted a draft regulation for
hydrogen vehicles. This component-level based
regulation based on a draft UN ECE document was
open for suggestions. HySafe partners made the
comment that a system-level based document with
performance requirements on the system configuration
would be more appropriate.
Finally, fire safety strategy on buses might not be
appropriate for cars. Indeed, whereas a PRD release
might be acceptable for buses because it takes place at
a safe height and because city buses are not likely to roll
over, it may not be the same for cars.
CONCLUSION
The use of CNG in bus and private vehicles is growing
steadily. Recent fire accidents involving CNG buses
have shown that tanks may in some explode. Such a
repeated scenario is certainly not acceptable having in
mind the tremendous amount of energy released when a
compressed tank bursts. Though none of the bus
mentioned in this article was ECE R110 compliant, this
article highlighted, potential improvements in current
CNG buses fire safety concepts. Among others, it
includes to rely on a system-level test and expectations
in combination with the current component-level test.
Fire safety should not solely rely on tank behaviour
when exposed to fire but also to additional and upstream
fire safety barriers. Thermal fuses can not be seen any
more as an ultimate option to control tank burst in case
of fire though "well" located.
Reported cases did not cause any injury or severe
damages. It would be a pity not to learn from these lucky
cases rather than wait for something unacceptable to
happen.
International regulations like UN ECE may also be
accompanied with international accident reporting
scheme in order to improve regulations content over
time.
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